Xi Jinping will consolidate his power in the coming year

China’s leader, Xi Jinping, is fond of weather-related and nautical metaphors. He often talks of fierce storms that could impede the country’s rise. In recent months, Mr Xi has warned officials to brace for “numerous major tests” amid “high winds, rough seas and daunting waves”. These are certainly testing times for the team he installed in late 2022 and early in 2023 to help him navigate the country’s growing economic, diplomatic and social challenges. Two prominent members of the team have already fallen. The coming year will not be plain sailing for Mr Xi’s other underlings.

The president might have been hoping to breathe a sigh of relief in 2023. His sweeping reshuffle of the top echelons of government—and, a few months earlier, of the Communist Party’s high command—had surrounded him with people he knew well and trusted. His abandonment late in 2022 of China’s draconian “zero-covid” approach to tackling the pandemic had led to a surge of deaths, but officials were confident that an economic rebound would help to buoy the public mood.

But growth failed to reignite. And by summer, flaws were appearing in Mr Xi’s political arrangements. First the foreign minister, Qin Gang, disappeared. A few weeks later the defence minister, General Li Shangfu, followed suit. Such a purge had not been seen in years.

In secret briefings, cadres were reportedly told that Mr Qin had “lifestyle issues” involving a mistress and a love-child. General Li was said to be under investigation for alleged corruption in a previous job. The clear message to China’s ruling elite was that their political demise showed Mr Xi’s probity and resolve: he would have no hesitation in punishing his own favourites if they misbehaved.

But among senior officials, the shake-up is likely to have raised questions: how much did Mr Xi know before he appointed them? If he had no inkling of their wrongdoing (the Communist Party bans officials from having extra-marital affairs) what does that suggest about the rigour of his vetting? Mr Xi has repeatedly stressed how tough this process should be.

There has been no sign that Mr Xi himself is in political trouble. State-controlled media still fawn over him as usual. More details may emerge about Mr Qin and General Li in the coming months. Reports will be sanitised to avoid any suggestion that Mr Xi made any mistake when appointing the two men, or showed any lack of judgment in his choice of close advisers.

But among Mr Xi’s underlings, more surprises are possible in 2024. The president still has no designated successor. Tensions could emerge as would-be candidates jockey for attention—or simply when yes-men compete with each other, regardless of their long-term ambitions.

One person to watch is Cai Qi, who became Mr Xi’s chief of staff in March 2023. He ranks only fifth in the seven-member Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC). But his closeness to Mr Xi, with whom he worked in Fujian province in the 1980s and 1990s, and later in Zhejiang province, is evident. He oversees matters relating to party propaganda and ideology, as well as Mr Xi’s personal security.

Li Qiang, the prime minister, who was also appointed in March 2023, ranks second in the PBSC, but his influence is less wide-ranging—his job focuses mainly on the economy. Many analysts regard him as an unusually weak holder of this title, despite his close work with Mr Xi in Zhejiang in the early 2000s. And with the economy in trouble, it will be hard for Mr Li to impress his boss.

It will also be hard for Mr Xi to burnish his own image. It is likely to have been dented by the country’s economic malaise and its chaotic exit from nearly three years of strict pandemic controls—after scattered small-scale protests against the zero-covid policy, during which a few protesters even dared to call for Mr Xi himself to step down. In 2024 China’s president will face the challenge of managing tense relations with the West. But he faces high winds and daunting waves at home, too. ■

James Miles, Senior China correspondent, The Economist

This article appeared in the China section of the print edition of The World Ahead 2024 under the headline “Xi and the yes-men”