Why are so many of the victims in Gaza children?

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CHILDREN ARE a very high proportion of the victims of war in Gaza. According to the Palestinian health ministry, around 3,000 children were killed in the first 17 days of the war—roughly 40% of the total death toll. Although there are some concerns that number could be inflated—the health ministry is run by Hamas and President Joe Biden said that he has “no notion that Palestinians are telling the truth about how many people are killed”—the ministry’s estimates have been broadly accurate in previous conflicts. In Ukraine, a conflict between two much bigger powers, children account for fewer than 550 of roughly 9,800 civilian fatalities over a much longer period. Gaza’s enormous child death toll reflects, among other things, its especially youthful demography. About half of the population of the Palestinian territories is younger than 20 years old, a much higher share than the average of other upper-middle income countries such as Iraq, Namibia and Thailand (see right-hand chart).

The basis of a youthful society is a high fertility rate, the number of children a typical woman will have in her lifetime. The rate in the Palestinian territories, including both Gaza (total population 2m) and the West Bank (3m), was 3.4 in 2021, according to the UN Population Division. From 2017 to 2019 the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) put it at 3.8. Detailed data that disaggregate Gaza and the West Bank are hard to come by. But, according to the PCBS, Gaza’s fertility was 3.9 during that period. These rates are far higher than those of neighbouring Israel, Jordan or Egypt and comparable to those of Ghana or Congo, both much poorer countries.

A fertility rate this high is typically associated with short lifespans, poverty and low levels of female education. The Palestinian territories do not have those characteristics. Average income per person in the territories is $4,600 a year, higher than in Egypt and Jordan. (The figure for Gaza is thought to be considerably lower.) More girls than boys are enrolled in secondary education. The Palestinian territories are unusual in combining poor-country fertility with upper-middle-income social characteristics.

Why? It seems likely that the long conflict with Israel and the influence of Hamas (which runs Gaza but not the West Bank) are partly responsible. Yasser Arafat, the former president of the Palestinian Authority, once said his people were conducting “a war of cradles”: population growth was a way to affirm Palestinian identity and perseverance. Hamas’s pro-natal rhetoric has been particularly vociferous. After taking control of Gaza in 2007 it sought to maintain the strip’s high fertility rate; which stood at 5.8 from 1999 to 2003, one of the highest anywhere.

Fertility has fallen since, as it has almost everywhere. But Gazans born in the baby boom of 20 years are now having their own families. In 2015 Gaza had about two thirds the population of the West Bank, the historic centre of Palestine. At current rates, it will be near parity within 25 years, giving Gaza a bigger voice in the debate over any future Palestinian state. ■

Editor’s note (November 10th): This article has been updated since it was published.