The Central Asian republics are cultivating new alliances

Russia’s war in Ukraine has rattled its traditional allies in post-Soviet Central Asia. These countries are bound to Moscow by formal ties of politics, economics and energy supply, as well as informal ties of family, culture and language, and they have looked askance at Russia’s invasion of another ex-Soviet neighbour. Yet even as they seek alternative alliances, in some ways they are becoming even more tightly entangled with their former colonial master.

The default position in the capitals of the five Central Asian republics, known as the “Stans” (see map), has been to profess neutrality over the war and refuse to give Russia diplomatic cover, beyond abstaining from UN votes condemning its aggression. That will continue in 2024. But so will Central Asia’s efforts to cultivate relations with other partners.

Chief among them is China. President Xi Jinping hosted the first China-Central Asia summit in 2023, and relations will deepen further in 2024. Not to be outdone, President Joe Biden welcomed the Central Asian leaders to Washington for their first summit with an American president. Charles Michel, chairman of the European Council, has sat down with the five leaders twice since Russia’s invasion. Ties with the West will continue to grow.

Kazakhstan—long close to the Kremlin but now feeling vulnerable along its 7,600-kilometre border with Russia—will be particularly receptive to Western overtures. The interests of China, Europe and the Central Asians overlap in promoting the Middle Corridor, a transport route from China to Europe bypassing Russia, along which trade has soared in response to the war. There will be progress on removing bottlenecks and expanding transport links in 2024. Ties with the Arab world are also expanding, after an inaugural Central Asia-Gulf Co-operation Council summit in 2023.

But some dependencies are here to stay. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan rely on Russia for migrant-labour remittances. They may become more dependent in 2024, as conscription in Russia intensifies labour shortages. Energy links will persist too: Kazakhstan exports over 90% of its oil via Russia, and is eyeing a deal to import gas; Uzbekistan has already signed one.

The risk of sanctions contagion will remain high. Trade with Russia has boomed as Central Asian states have acted as middlemen for many goods. Uzbek and Kyrgyz firms have been penalised for sanctions-dodging. Western efforts to encourage Central Asian compliance with sanctions on Russia will grow in 2024.

Central Asia is proof that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has disconcerted its allies, who are wooing, and being wooed by, alternative partners. But the region’s symbiotic ties with Russia, forged over centuries, should not be underestimated. Russia will not retreat from a region it considers its backyard. Its influence in Central Asia will remain strong in 2024.■

Joanna Lillis, freelance correspondent, The Economist, Almaty