Russians have emigrated in huge numbers since the war in Ukraine

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THE FIRST exodus came at the start of the war: up to 300,000 Russians fled the country in the first few months of their president’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. A second wave set off when Vladimir Putin announced a “partial mobilisation” in September, and desperate young men rushed to border crossings to avoid the draft. Establishing the precise scale of emigration prompted by the war is tricky. The Kremlin has, unsurprisingly, not published data on the matter. And independent estimates have varied from 500,000 to 1m. But a new analysis has narrowed that range (see chart).

Re: Russia, an analysis and policy network, has examined various estimates and available data from countries that have accepted large numbers of Russian émigrés. They found that between 817,000 and 922,000 people have left Russia since February 2022. The largest recipient countries were Kazakhstan and Serbia, each with 150,000 emigrants. But Russians have moved all over the world, including between 30,000 and 40,000 who went to America, according to the estimates.

There are uncertainties about the data. Russians may travel through several transit countries before settling. Others return home having struggled to establish a life abroad, often citing difficulties securing work. Some returnees suggest they will try to emigrate again once their financial circumstances allow it.

Emigration from Mr Putin’s Russia is not new. In the first 19 years of his rule 1.6m-2m people left the country (though the rate had been declining since the turbulent decade after 1989). The rate increased significantly around 2012, when Mr Putin returned to the Russian presidency in an election marked by fraud and protests (see chart). Yet the invasion of Ukraine has caused the single largest exodus prompted by political upheaval since the 1920s.

Also significant is the profile of those who are able to move. In general, Russia’s wartime émigrés have relatively high levels of income, social capital and education. That is bad news for Russia, both economically and socially. Re: Russia reckons that the wartime emigrants account for roughly 1% of Russia’s workforce, exacerbating an acute labour shortage. The Gaidar Institute, a think-tank in Moscow, said that 35% of manufacturing businesses did not have enough workers in April, the highest figure since 1996. Shortages of specialists are especially severe: according to one Kremlin official, at least 100,000 IT professionals left the country in 2022. With no vision for the future aside from international isolation and war, the Kremlin will struggle to stem the tide.■