Nasser al-Kidwa on why it was inevitable that Gaza would erupt in violence

THE SITUATION in Gaza was bound to explode. What else was to be expected in a tiny strip of land, devoid of natural resources, even water, but home to approximately 2.3m people, most of them living in abject poverty and locked within the strip, while the few able to leave could only do so with great difficulty?

Although Israel left Gaza in 2005, it maintained full control of its land, shoreline and air space, and kept the strip under siege, preventing potential economic development and normal living conditions. It left the strip with no exit point except for the restrictively small Rafah crossing to Egypt, which was only occasionally open.

Following a war with the Fatah-backed Palestinian Authority (PA), Hamas has controlled Gaza since 2007. Since then, the strategy of the PA contributed in different ways to the increasing suffering of the trapped population—including paying reduced or no salaries to government employees in the territory (whose wages the PA has remained responsible for paying), reducing financial contributions to cover essential needs, and not having any serious strategy to end the split with Hamas. Meanwhile, Hamas failed miserably in governance of the strip.

Israel, for its part, waged war against Gaza every few years (although these conflicts pale in comparison to what is happening now). Successive Israeli governments sought these wars to punish Gaza for having Hamas in its midst, but also to keep Hamas in power. Binyamin Netanyahu, Israel’s prime minister, insisted on keeping Hamas at the helm in order to sustain a split in Palestinian politics between Hamas and Fatah, whose power base is on the West Bank, and to stymie any political resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

As such, all of the ingredients for an explosion were present, and the question was not if it would happen, but when and how. Unfortunately, it has happened since October 7th in the most inhuman way, not only in terms of the Hamas attacks that day and what accompanied them, including the taking of hostages, but also the subsequent Israeli insistence on revenge—which this time encompasses the intent to destroy Hamas.

Mr Netanyahu’s new strategy requires much broader destruction than what has been witnessed in previous wars with the Palestinians. It also requires savage tactics vis-à-vis civilian inhabitants, especially in the event of a ground incursion—which appears imminent—in order to minimise casualties in the Israeli army.

The world has just witnessed the forced displacement of about 1m Palestinian civilians from northern to southern Gaza, in tandem with the Israeli army taking measures to prevent any humanitarian assistance from reaching the civilian population, including but not limited to a blockade on water, food, medicine and fuel. Thus, a humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza is more than likely, unless Israel changes its stance. Egypt’s stance is also worth noting: the original Israeli scheme immediately after October 7th was to transfer Gazans, or most of them, to the Egyptian Sinai, but it failed in the face of adamant rejection by the Egyptian government.

The coming days and weeks will no doubt bring unprecedented agony for the civilian inhabitants of Gaza. However, a crucial question is “what then”?

The PA is impotent and has no credibility, first and foremost in the eyes of the Palestinian people. The West, meanwhile, has until now seemed to rally around Israel, maybe because of perceived Israeli vulnerability. It appears to accept Israel’s flouting of international humanitarian law, while providing Israel with broad support, including a readiness to offer military support. Additionally, there is the potential for the confrontation to spread to include Hizbullah, a Lebanon-based militia, on Israel’s northern border. Whether that happens or not, it is now clear that the future is likely to include a different Israeli government, a different Palestinian leadership and, probably, a different Hamas.

Uprooting Hamas completely will be impossible as it is embedded in the social fabric of the Palestinian people in Gaza and beyond. However, the weakening of Hamas as a result of a broad and violent Israeli military operation is a different matter and could lead to a different Hamas—one that is weaker, militarily and politically, if the Palestinian public mood towards the organisation sours (though this will depend on the course of events in coming days and weeks).

A changed Hamas would have to be part of the broader Palestinian movement. This movement could be reinvigorated at the end of this military confrontation. However, it needs to be restructured. That will require the departure of the dominant group of leaders within the PA in Ramallah—including its 87-year-old president, Mahmoud Abbas—through a careful transition. At the same time, the Palestine Liberation Organisation should be maintained as the umbrella organisation, with the participation of all of the factions and political tendencies. This could open the way for a political solution in partnership with a future, different Israeli government.

However, the current trajectory of events seems to be leading to more bloodshed, more destruction and more hatred. At the very least, we need world leaders to insist on compliance with international humanitarian law and, despite the difficulties, to encourage the political vision that would lead to a dignified life for the Palestinian people, not only in Gaza but also in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem. In other words, a better life in the State of Palestine alongside the State of Israel. In the midst of war, we need to have the courage to scream as loud as we can: “We need peace in the Middle East.” ■

Nasser al-Kidwa is a former foreign minister of the Palestinian Authority and a former representative of the Palestine Liberation Organisation to the UN. He is the nephew of the former PLO leader Yasser Arafat.

Read more of our By Invitations about Israel and Gaza, as well as other coverage of the crisis.