An interview with Hsiao Bi-khim, candidate for Taiwan’s vice-president

On December 12th Hsiao Bi-khim, Taiwan’s former representative to America and current vice-presidential candidate for the ruling Democratic and Progressive Party (DPP) in an election to be held on January 13th 2024, sat down for an interview with The Economist at the DPP’s headquarters in Taipei. She spoke about the challenges of representing Taiwan, which has no formal statehood, at a tumultuous time in both American politics and the US-China relationship. She also laid out her vision for “cat-warrior diplomacy”, a pragmatic way to strengthen Taiwan’s international position—and counter China’s “wolf-warrior” aggression. This is a transcript of the conversation, lightly edited for length and clarity.

The Economist: Tell us about the challenges you faced representing Taiwan in America, in terms of Taiwan’s unrecognised status, pressure from China and also working across partisan lines.

Hsiao Bi-khim: Well, first I’d rather not use the word unrecognised. We are in a very unique international situation, a one-and-only unique situation. But Taiwan is certainly recognised for our democratic and economic achievements, and we are proud of that. We’d like to highlight that in all of our work in Washington as well as elsewhere around the world. I think our democratic and economic achievements are important as a foundation for seeking greater support for Taiwan.
 
Of course, as I said, we are unique, and that creates some challenges. We need to be innovative. We need to be very pragmatic and flexible. There are aspects of diplomacy that other countries take for granted that are part of traditions and precedents, but do not necessarily apply to Taiwan. We have to find pathways that are not only workable, but also pragmatic. I’ve tried to navigate that space by finding the most effective venues for Taiwan. 

For example, by forging ahead in deepening our economic relationship. We signed a trade agreement called the US-Taiwan Initiative on 21st Century Trade, which we are pleased to say was the first trade agreement of the Biden administration with an international partner. We’ve also had to find a very unique pathway in resolving some long-standing double taxation issues that have been an obstacle to mutual investment. This is a very unique pathway. Again, not having a treaty status has made this very difficult for decades. But I think we have been able to find that very effective and unique pathway with the support of Congress and bipartisan friends.

Now, you mentioned Chinese pressure. Of course, that is pervasive, always there. We are mindful of the constant anger tantrums that they tend to throw. But I think the world is also quite familiar with that. Many of our friends in the international community are also working with us to find ways to overcome such pressure and to find appropriate ways for Taiwan to be constructive contributors to the international system. 

The third aspect you mentioned, balancing US politics, has been complicated. But I think we’ve managed to, based on our shared values and our shared interests, build a degree of unity in the United States across partisan lines in supporting Taiwan. That has been very meaningful for us. 

TE: There are two different camps in the US on Taiwan policy. Some argue for public and vocal support, while some argue for more moderate and pragmatic ways. How do you walk the line of getting US support for Taiwan, without provoking China?

HB: First of all, I don’t think there are different camps when it comes to standing with and supporting Taiwan. I think across the board in the US, whether it’s across partisan lines or across different views, there is a strong degree of agreement that Taiwan should not be alone. The tremendous pressures that we face have evolved to become global issues. It’s clear that President Biden, in his numerous outreaches to international partners, through summits, bilateral, trilateral, G7, NATO, has reiterated the point that peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait is an indispensable component of global prosperity. That is a widely shared view in DC. 

Of course, there are some differences in approach. Some take an approach that is much more vocal than others, and there are some who take an approach of doing more but saying less. But I think that support is certainly there, and ultimately we need to keep a constant goal in mind. That is this partnership must serve to strengthen Taiwan and make Taiwan much more resilient to pressure. So everything we do is to deter disruptions to the peace and stability of the region. Everything we are doing is to strengthen Taiwan so that we have greater confidence to defend our democracy. That is also very important to many. 

TE: Do you think one of the approaches is more helpful?

HB: It’s a very delicate balance. But we’ve managed to convince many of our friends to support substantive initiatives in the relationship, in strengthening our security partnership and our economic partnership. 

TE: Can you tell us a bit more about the security side of that? What have you achieved and are there any policy gaps between the US and Taiwan?

HB: On the defence and security side, President Biden’s outreach to other partners and highlighting that shared interest in peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait is foundational. We have at least three approaches to our defence and security partnership. 

First of all, it’s about fortifying our own capabilities and strengthening our public will to defend. We must assert a strong public will before we can expect anyone else to help us. And I think that’s important. That’s what we have done through numerous efforts by President Tsai Ing-wen [Ms Hsiao’s dpp colleague and Taiwan’s president], for example, increasing our defence budget and lengthening the training period for our conscripts. And these are all complicated political decisions. But the fact that we are making these difficult decisions and they are also widely supported with lots of communication with our public, we are making some significant progress there. 

A second aspect of our defence and security partnership involves the relationship with the United States. We have a legal framework, the Taiwan Relations Act, which provides that space for the US to help Taiwan with our self-defence. That comes in many ways. It includes acquisitions that we have made over the years in significant defence articles. That is an area where we have also made progress, both in formality and also in substance. In formality, for decades it’s been a practice where big announcements would be made every few years and bundled together. But now we have a regular practice of on-time reviews of our needs and our requests are reviewed on a timely basis. Also, significant reforms on the US side expedite that process, so Taiwan can acquire other systems that we need. 

On the substantive part, we have come a long way in reaching a degree of a greater agreement in priority acquisitions. We have come a long way after some years of debates between our two sides on the types of asymmetric systems that would be needed to actually deter an invasion. We have come some way in agreeing to some specific systems that are reflected in our current acquisition list. So we will continue to engage closely in communicating our priorities in that way. 

There are some other additional efforts where we have made advances. Broadly speaking, this is an area where I prefer to do more and say less, but there are a few public aspects about this. That has been quite visible in legislation and congressional initiatives, such as presidential drawdown authority and foreign military financing, as new tools to supplement the very robust defence partnership that we have. These will all serve to enhance the very strong security partnership that is supported by the Taiwan Relations Act.

TE: Can you tell us a bit about cat warriors?

HB: The first time I called myself a cat warrior was when I was about to embark on my journey to represent Taiwan in the United States. The context was I will be facing a group of very aggressive wolf warriors, and a journalist asked me how I would deal with that. I said, I’ll call myself a cat warrior.

I think there are a lot of aspects of that. It’s not just about my love or fondness of cats. First of all, cats are much more lovable than wolves. In diplomacy, it’s about making friends. It’s about making yourselves lovable. The second point is as I have observed with my cats, they are very nimble and very flexible. Sometimes they appear in unexpected places. They have an ability to balance. I see them walking on my stair railings. They can balance themselves in very delicate spaces.

And of course, cats have nine lives. We don’t want to use up our lives, so we have to be very prudent and cautious. I have also observed that cats have the ability to tread softly but firmly. They tread softly, but they do have the strength to jump into high places. They are able to find the right positions of defence. Also they are quite capable of having an independent mindset. You can’t force them to do things they don’t want to. You don’t command cats. You’ve got to be nice to them, and cats will repay your kindness with warmth. So you’ve got to respect cats. They have a mind of their own. There are a lot of characteristics of cats that I think are quite symbolic of the unique international situation and the challenges that we are in.

TE: If the DPP wins, as the cat-warrior vice president, how would you deal with cross-strait pressures?

HB: Along the lines of my cat-warrior philosophy in managing a very delicate balance in a very volatile environment, we have to manage things in a very prudent, cautious way. We need to strengthen ourselves. So we also need to invest in building our own muscles. We need to have an environment where we have friends who will stand with us.

I think, again, we are lovable. Taiwanese people are some of the most generous people in the world, always willing to be helpful. That was pretty obvious during the covid-19 pandemic. We are a force for good. We are a positive influence. Not only in the Indo-Pacific region, but on a global level too. We want to sustain that.

But like cats, we can be warm and cuddly, but don’t mess with us. We need to be open, practical, pragmatic in engaging with the world, and shouldering significant responsibilities. We have a responsibility to maintain the stability of the region. We have a responsibility to contribute to stable and productive global supply chains. We have a responsibility to global prosperity, too. So as we shoulder these very heavy responsibilities, we will also continue to engage with the world in a way that the world will be more supportive than ever of Taiwan.

In regards to the cross-strait relationship, I think we also have to be very pragmatic in the sense that President Tsai has reiterated her commitment to the status quo on many occasions. There are many stakeholders in the status quo. In fact, the whole world is a stakeholder in keeping the status quo of the Taiwan Strait. So that is not only a commitment to the people of Taiwan, but also a consensus. According to polls, a large portion of our society agree that at the moment, this is the most practical approach to Taiwan’s status. It’s by no means the most satisfactory approach, but it is the largest common denominator.

We strongly believe that it is also an approach that the stakeholders across the Taiwan Strait will be able to address their domestic challenges while living in peace with the rest of the region. So that is something we have to manage and sustain. Of course, the status quo is not static. It’s a dynamic process, and we are facing constant pressures by the PRC [People’s Republic of China]. They are taking steps to disrupt the status quo. That is why we need to also invest more, not only in our defence capabilities, but also in ensuring that the world is with us in balancing this very delicate situation.

TE:  So what I’m hearing is that the response is to strengthen Taiwan’s defence and relations with partners. It’s not necessarily having dialogue with the PRC, which is what we hear from other candidates. Do you think that’s a realistic strategy?

HB: We have reiterated that we’re open to dialogue. But we also believe that dialogue is most meaningful when it is conducted on a foundation of strength. That is why we need to invest a lot in building our own strength. Dialogue without strength, if it involves accommodating political positions that are not accepted by the people of Taiwan, that dialogue would not be sustainable.

So it’s important to be open to dialogue, but at the same time continue to invest in the strength that will help build public confidence in our ability to manage this very complicated and delicate relationship.

TE:  It’s possible we could see a return to a Republican administration in the US, maybe a Trump administration. What are the implications for Taiwan if that happens?

HB: One rule for my work in DC is I never get involved in American politics. And I’m not going to comment on either side or the political parties involved. I arrived in DC towards the end of the Trump administration and then extended my work into the Biden administration. I’ve worked very hard to ensure a degree of continuity of policy across different administrations. I can say with much confidence that there has been that degree of continuity. 

Actually, not just during my term. For decades, we have seen across different administrations some long-term consistency in policy. And again, the Taiwan Relations Act is foundational to that. So we will have to manage whoever wins the next election in the US and try to continue this very important and robust partnership.

In my work in DC, I work with people from all across the political spectrum. And I think there are a few aspects that would contribute to a long-term and very robust Taiwan-US relationship, including identifying the core values and interests that make this relationship so important. And we have a lot of agreement there. The values in freedom, democracy, and a rules-based international order, and the interests in peace, stability, and prosperity for our people. Based on that, we have a lot of work to do.

The second point is that many of us around the world expect a strong American democracy. And American democracy and our democracy are both under a lot of stress. Disinformation and influence campaigns by authoritarian states—we have to constantly build stronger resilience against such disruptions to our democracy. And we need to constantly strengthen our democratic institutions. So this is a project for us and a project for many people around the world who maintain a strong faith in the supremacy of a democratic system.

A third aspect is that we have domestically partisan politics. Americans do too. We cannot afford to let Taiwan become an issue of partisan difference. For me, it’s all been about building unity. In the United States, across the board, the unity of support for Taiwan was reflected in a number of congressional initiatives and policy gestures. Whoever is elected in Taiwan or in the US, this particular approach should be the most sustainable one over the long term.

TE: There is an argument from the US that although Taiwan is a key security interest for the US, it should stop saying that. Because that’s going to provoke China, and the US should say it’s up to the people of Taiwan and China to decide their future. Do you think it’s helpful to say Taiwan is a security interest for the US?

HB: I think Taiwan is a security interest primarily for the people of Taiwan. But Taiwan is also a security interest for the world. That point has been made clear by all of the international statements highlighting peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait as indispensable to global prosperity. It’s fair to say that we all have a stake in ensuring that Taiwan’s security and peace in this region is maintained. Taiwan’s peace, stability and security is also in the interest of the people of China. Only where there is a very stable environment can we have healthy, orderly cross-strait relations, including business, economic, cultural, and other ties. And so I believe maintaining the status quo of peace and stability is in the interest of most stakeholders in the world.

TE: If the DPP wins, would you be moving forward on cross-strait exchanges, like cultural and student exchanges? Do you think they’re beneficial or do you think they also carry potential for infiltration or influence?

HB: A lot of those exchanges were disrupted by covid-19. We had our border regulations, but the PRC had much more restrictive travel and border controls. We’ve already made announcements about opening Taiwan to more tourism activities and travel. Our doors are open to normal trade, business, and other cultural activities. But we also need to always keep in mind that there are times where our trade has been weaponised for the purpose of political coercion.

While we would be open to having normal trade relations, we have to be mindful not to put all our eggs in one basket, as the former government did, by advocating much deeper integration with the Chinese economy. We need to be balanced. We need to diversify. We need to open global markets in order to balance over-dependency and the risks of China’s weaponization of trade and using trade, economic and other cultural or tourism activities as tools for political coercion. They’ve applied political coercion towards Taiwan, but they’ve also used that towards other countries as well. This is part of their regular playbook. We all need to be clear-eyed about that.

TE: You’ve mentioned that you thought a lot before deciding to join the race as the DPP candidate. What was your thought process? What challenges do you see in the domestic political sphere?

HB: I’m not a newcomer in Taiwan politics. In fact, I’m a veteran of some sort. I, like many of my colleagues in the DPP, am strongly committed to Taiwan and to fortifying our democracy. In fact, I’ve always been inspired by the founders of the DPP, who were willing to risk their lives, the possibility of being imprisoned, to form and organise this political party. That degree of courage and commitment is very important as a kind of guiding post in all of the work that we do.

Having said that, Taiwan politics is also very noisy and loud. I’ve been part of that in the past.

This transition into a diplomatic role in the United States was a different type of experience. I felt I could do a lot for my country without getting involved in the day-to-day partisan bickering. Of course, political competition is a necessity for democracy. We must not shy away from normal political competition. But when it evolves into a level where our energies are consumed into issues that are not as constructive in the public policy realm, then I’d probably rather have more space to do constructive work for my country.

That was part of my deliberations. And in DC I had built many partners and friendships and I was on a course where I was becoming quite familiar with how to get things done in the town. So making the transition was a decision I had to consider seriously. But now that I’m back, I’m committed to winning this race. And I am quite confident that we are the best set of candidates to win this.

TE: DPP’s recent campaigning has been on preserving democracy and not autocracy. How much do you think that’s resonating with the electorate right now? 

HB: China’s always had an overweight position in our domestic politics. From the very first [presidential] election we had in 1996, they attempted interference with threats and missile exercises around the timeframe of our first ever presidential election. China is pervasive in different aspects of our lives. It’s not only on the security aspect, but also in daily economic aspects. What type of economic relationship with China do we want to have? Is it putting all our eggs in the Chinese basket? Or is it about diversification? All of that’s been part of our broader debate on how Taiwan can be resilient economically and also internationally. 

There’s always a China aspect to a lot of the work that we do here in the public space. That is something that we have to address. But there are also many other domestic and social issues here that have also been highlighted in previous elections. The DPP’s take on domestic politics is a rather progressive position in a number of public policy issues. Such as marriage equality, LGBTQ rights and lowering the voting age. Trying to empower our young people in the public policy process has also been an important aspect of the DPP campaign.

There will be many aspects to our campaign. The international aspect and cross-strait relations are part of it. But we do have to address the primary concerns of the Taiwanese public, which are not unlike the youth of other countries. Many young people in other parts of the world are interested in their future, in quality jobs, in affordable housing, and quality of life, space for innovation, creativity, and all of that. That’s certainly something we will continue to address. ■