There is a new scramble for Africa

Fights among foreigners for influence have seldom been kind to Africa. In the first “scramble for Africa”, European powers raced to grab as much as they could. In the cold war America and the Soviet Union staged coups and backed rebels and tyrants to gain advantage, bringing misery upon the continent’s people. In 2024 foreign meddling is set to intensify, fuelling the fires of conflict in a region already being buffeted by coups and civil wars and strengthening the hand of autocrats and military juntas.

The end of the cold war brought a brief hiatus that allowed a flowering of democracy. Tyrants like Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire (now Congo) and Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia were kicked out as their patrons lost interest. South Africa was forced to sweep away its system of white-minority rule. America, among others, set aside “interest-based” diplomacy for the altogether fluffier “values-based” sort, founded on promoting human rights and democracy.

The lull did not last long. In 2000 the EU and China each hosted their first summits of African leaders, and have since done so roughly every three years (the Forum on China–Africa Co-operation is due to be held again in 2024). Chinese aid and investment is particularly prized because it generally does not come with meddlesome conditions like respect for human rights. China’s firms have built railways, roads, bridges, ports and more, all financed by loans from its banks. Its economic largesse has tightened diplomatic ties, making China the fastest-rising foreign power in Africa. Its soft power has also enabled it to project hard power. In 2016 China opened its first naval base on the continent, in Djibouti, next to American and French facilities.

Seeing China’s success, other countries soon followed. Turkey and India held their first summits in 2008 and both have since expanded their diplomatic presence, to 44 and 47 embassies respectively. This stampede has created opportunities for African countries in trade and investment. But economic and diplomatic jousting has since degenerated into proxy wars—particularly since Russia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) expanded their presence. Most damaging is the military support provided by Russia and the UAE to the Rapid Support Forces, a rebellious paramilitary group in Sudan that is battling the national army and waging genocide in Darfur.

And although not directly responsible for the spate of coups that have toppled governments across the Sahel, Russia’s quick backing for juntas has undermined sanctions against them, which may have encouraged others to grab power. A unit of Fitch, a ratings agency, reckons there is a strong chance of further coups, with Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Equatorial Guinea particularly at risk. ■

Jonathan Rosenthal, Africa editor, The Economist