The war in Ukraine may be heading for stalemate

“WE DO not assess that the conflict is a stalemate,” insisted Jake Sullivan, America’s national security adviser, in late August 2023. Ukraine, he said, was taking territory “on a methodical, systematic basis”. Alas, the evidence now suggests that Ukraine’s counter-offensive has stopped well short of its stated minimum goal, and that the war may indeed have entered a period of military stalemate. The coming year will be a difficult, dangerous period for Ukraine.

Its counter-offensive, which began in June, made modest progress on the flanks of Bakhmut, an eastern town that Russia had captured in May, and in the south, in Zaporizhia province. A combination of weary units, limited ammunition and wet weather will slow offensives during the winter, though some small-unit infantry attacks will continue.

The winter is likely to see a new and intense campaign of long-range strikes from both sides. Russia has been stockpiling missiles and is likely to attack Ukraine’s power grid again. Ukraine has been accumulating drones and will keep up strikes on Russian-occupied Crimea, aided by a small injection of American-supplied ATACMS missiles. It might also widen its attacks to include Russia’s power grid, in part to establish a form of deterrence. The strikes may help Ukrainian morale but their strategic impact is likely to be modest.

The crucial question for 2024 is which side can rebuild more high-quality forces the quicker. That is partly a matter of manpower. Russia’s army has fallen short of its recruitment targets, but scraped together enough troops to hold the line through the summer. If it wants to go on the offensive, as it did in the winter of 2022-23, it may need to conduct a larger wave of mobilisation. It also has a large pool of conscripts, though committing these to war would involve significant political risks. Ukraine must also decide whether it conscripts men in their younger 20s, many of whom have so far avoided the draft.

Men also need weapons and ammunition. Russia ramped up defence production in late 2022, and it might produce more than 2m shells during 2024, along with hundreds of new and refurbished tanks. North Korea is also sending a massive number of shells, boosting Russian firepower further. Western governments invested later, so Ukraine is unlikely to have an advantage in artillery ammunition—the single most important factor at the tactical level—until late 2023 or early 2024.

Ukraine will not get another massive influx of equipment, as it did in spring 2023. Instead the focus will be on Western help with repairing equipment. A key decision for Western governments is whether they re-open production lines for weapons that they themselves no longer operate, or pass on sensitive intellectual property to Ukrainian factories. The arrival of America’s Ground-Launched Small-Diameter Bomb (GLSDB) in early 2024 will replenish Ukraine’s arsenal of longer-range missiles. It will also receive F-16 jets, though they are unlikely, on their own, to have a transformative effect on the battlefield.

Timing is important. Each side will hope to take the initiative. Ukraine wants to keep a spring offensive on the table but will struggle to muster the land power to do this. Vladimir Putin, Russia’s president, will also want his army to keep up symbolic offensives, like the one under way around Avdiivka in the east. But constantly throwing poorly trained troops into grinding battle will weaken the Russian army without moving the front line.

A key challenge for 2024—and one that will shape the subsequent year—is whether Ukraine’s partners can expand and reform training. Its summer offensive highlighted many problems. Some will need to be fixed if the next serious offensive is to be more successful. Ukraine’s battalions and brigades, for instance, need far more staff officers capable of planning and commanding complex operations involving many units across a wide front.

If neither side can generate a meaningful offensive threat in 2024, the war is likely to be dominated by factors beyond the battlefield. The Black Sea may become increasingly central, with Russia attacking cargo ships and Ukraine striking at Russia’s fleet and facilities. A NATO summit in Washington in July will be viewed as a test of Western support. Russia’s strategy is simple: keep going until Ukraine’s partners grow weary. The West intends to stay the course. Optimistic officials argue that the war is accelerating Russia’s political decomposition. But pessimists warn that Mr Putin can keep this up for years. ■

Shashank Joshi, Defence editor, The Economist