In Iran, 2024 is all about the succession

As conflict again rages in the Middle East, one issue continues to fixate Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s 84-year-old supreme leader—the survival of his regime. War in Gaza; escalation in the region’s Shia heartlands of Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen; America’s floating military bases off its shores; and above all, the ructions of his disgruntled population: all his challenges will be seen through the prism of ensuring that his system, wilayat al-faqih, or clerical rule, continues after his death.

The answer to all of them is Mojtaba, the supreme leader’s 54-year-old second son and unofficial successor. As the senior chaplain to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the regime’s praetorian guard, he sits at the apex of the republic’s two principal pillars, its military and clerical establishment. As he enters his dotage, the father will entrust ever more power to his son. Ambitious clerics will prove their loyalty by calling him ayatollah, the senior scholarly rank required of any successor. Diplomats in Iran will study his place in official ceremonies to track his growing power.

In the region, Iran will continue to try to escalate without being dragged into direct confrontation with either America or Israel. Its regional satellites will struggle to find a balance between projecting strength while stopping short of provoking an impetuous war which might blow their deterrence capabilities. Iran will encourage Hizbullah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen and pro-Iranian Shia militias in Iraq to sabre-rattle and launch sporadic missile strikes on American and Israeli targets.

Internally, the regime will project uncompromising power, while demonstrating sufficient flexibility to absorb domestic discontent. The dress code, the emblem of the Islamic Republic since the revolution in 1979, will ease. Men will go out in shorts and women cast off their veils, even as surveillance cameras keep watch. Some will receive fines, but as with satellite dishes in the 1990s, the regime will continue to give way to social pressure. Economically, Iran’s oil sector will continue to benefit from high prices resulting from regional tensions.

Many challenges await Mojtaba’s succession. Iran’s various satellites could break ranks and lash out, as Hamas did in October in southern Israel. Its Lebanese counterpart, Hizbullah, might seek to emulate its incursion, in the north. Israel’s strategists could try to seize the window of opportunity afforded by the presence of so many aircraft-carriers to precipitate an American attack on Iran. There is a considerable risk they will miscalculate.

Shia clerics might balk at blessing a dynasty—the very thing they staged a revolution to overthrow. Above all, Iran’s 87m people might seek to slough off a stubborn theocracy that they increasingly consider an anachronism. Still, the mayhem raging elsewhere in the region will remind Iranians of the costs of upheaval. Mojtaba will get closer to taking the helm. ■

Nicolas Pelham, Middle East correspondent, The Economist