China’s appeal to poor countries is changing

Not long after he assumed power in 2012, Xi Jinping began talking about reviving the historic Silk Road, a network of trade routes that once connected east and west. Little did the world know that these musings would turn into Mr Xi’s signature foreign policy. In the years that followed, China laid thousands of miles of tarmac and poured an ocean of concrete, building ports and pipelines across the globe. In 2023 the country celebrated the tenth anniversary of this infrastructure binge, which came to be known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

More than 150 countries signed on to the scheme, under which China doled out hundreds of billions of dollars in loans and grants. Many receiving countries badly needed the infrastructure China has helped provide. But there have been plenty of problems, too. So the anniversary festivities were accompanied by a reassessment. The BRI is changing, along with Mr Xi’s message to the global south.

The strongest criticism of the BRI is that it has contributed to dangerous debt levels in poor countries, some of which are now teetering on the edge of default. During the scheme’s first decade, Chinese lenders paid little attention to human rights, corruption or risk assessments. Deals were often secret, resulting in plenty of white elephants. When debt needs restructuring, China tends to go it alone, shunning other lenders and driving a hard bargain behind closed doors.

That has turned some countries off. Meanwhile, a lack of consistent returns on their investments has disappointed Chinese banks. But far from scrapping his project, Mr Xi is trying to make it more sustainable. Now, he says, China should seek “small but beautiful” projects—less risky, more profitable and with a focus on green energy and digital infrastructure. This is not just a concession to the global concerns of the day, but a sign that the normative part of the plan, which was always there, could now become as important as the economic part.

It may be pouring less concrete, but China has not lost its desire to lead the global south. It will always be a developing country, no matter how rich it gets, says Mr Xi: “We will continue to do our utmost in raising the representation and voice of developing nations in the global governance system.” That may sound benign, but Mr Xi’s words have a deeper meaning. He is trying to rally poor countries around his own vision of global governance, one that rejects universal values. He has staked out China’s claim in several new foreign-policy proposals, such as the Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative and Global Civilisation Initiative.

These projects may appeal to countries that resent American bullying and Europe’s colonial legacy. They represent a beefing up of the implicit message that has long existed, that China’s development model, which downgrades human rights, is better for poor states than the one put forward by arrogant Western democracies. Beseeching countries to hold free elections or respect free speech is interfering in their internal affairs, say officials in Beijing. They regard liberal values as a form of racism propagated by the West.

China preaches a moral relativism that is music to the ears of autocrats. Its pitch will only grow louder in 2024. America and its allies should not underestimate the allure of China’s message. Many countries are unhappy with the current world order. Those who see value in it must come to its defence. ■

Roger McShane, China editor, The Economist